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a b s t r a c t
There is a puzzling fact about recent discussions on global justice. The debate, as 
of today, is fairly sophisticated and advanced, and all kinds of views have been defen-
ded. However, this debate has often ignored some of the most flagrant injustices of the 
real world, or is useless to asses them. Consider the following example: currently, the 
international financial system is set up in such a way that it forces countries (usually 
poor ones) to repay their sovereign debts, even if these debts are not morally binding 
for them. Thus, entire generations end up burdened with debts that were fraudulently 
incurred in their name. Despite the fact that this problem is massive, global justice 
scholars have either neglected it, or have not addressed it adequately. In this paper, 
I attempt to solve the puzzle. That is, I try to explain why there is such a gap in the 
global justice literature. Also, I propose a new approach to global justice which, in 
my view, fills this gap.
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r e s u m e N
Hay un hecho enigmático acerca de las recientes discusiones sobre justicia glo-
bal. El debate, al día de hoy, es bastante sofisticado y avanzado, y se han defendido 
todo tipo de teorías. Sin embargo, este debate típicamente ha ignorado algunas de las 
más flagrantes injusticias del mundo real, o es inútil para evaluarlas. Considérese el 
siguiente ejemplo: actualmente, el sistema financiero internacional está organizado 
de manera tal que fuerza a los países (habitualmente pobres) a pagar sus deudas so-
beranas, aun cuando estas no son vinculantes. De esta manera, generaciones enteras 
terminan siendo cargadas con deudas que fueron incurridas de manera fraudulenta 
en su nombre. A pesar de que este problema es masivo, los especialistas en justicia 
global lo han ignorado, o no lo han tratado adecuadamente. En este trabajo, intento 
explicar este enigma. Esto es, intento explicar por qué existe semejante ausencia en 
los debates recientes sobre justicia global. Además, propongo un nuevo enfoque a la 
justicia global que, desde mi punto de vista, subsana parcialmente esta deficiencia.
P a l a b r a s  c l av e :
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New DirectioNs iN Global Justice:  
aN aGeNt-PriNciPal aPProach
There is a puzzling fact about recent discussions on global jus-
tice. The debate, as of today, is fairly sophisticated and advanced, 
and all kinds of views have been defended. However, this debate 
has often ignored some of the most flagrant injustices of the real 
world or is useless to asses them. Consider the following exam-
ple: currently, the international financial system is set up in such 
a way that it forces countries (usually poor ones) to repay their 
sovereign debts, even if these debts are not morally binding for 
them. If a corrupt public official borrows funds from an interna-
tional agency, and uses these funds for his own private purposes, 
the international community considers the state, and not the ruler, 
responsible for the debt (and the interest rates associated with the 
debt). Thus, entire generations end up burdened with debts that 
were fraudulently incurred in their name. Despite the fact that this 
problem is massive, global justice scholars have either neglected 
it, or have not addressed it adequately.
In this paper, I attempt to solve the puzzle. That is, I try to ex-
plain why there is such a gap in the global justice literature. Also, 
I propose a new approach to global justice which, in my view, fills 
this gap. I organize the paper as follows. First, I describe the two 
most important traditions in the global justice debate. Following 
Samuel Scheffler1, I call the first one “additive” and the second one 
“unitary”. Second, I show how these traditions rely on a premise 
that make the most pressing issues of global justice invisible. I call 
this premise “outcome-view”. Third, I propose a different way 
of approaching global justice which, I believe, radically departs 
from the additive and unitary traditions. This new way, I believe, 
proposes the new direction that global justice debates should take.
1 Scheffler, S. (2014). The idea of global justice: a progress report. The Harvard 
Review of Philosophy, 20, 17-35.
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the aDDitive aND the uNitary coNcePtioNs. 
Discussions of global justice typically include debates about several 
different issues, such as world poverty, human rights, fair trade, 
immigration and many others. Two very different philosophical 
views typically lie at the heart of these discussions: the additive 
and the unitary conceptions2. These conceptions can be described 
as follows.
On the additive conception, a just world would be a world 
made up of individually just societies. The norms of distributive 
justice apply directly to individual societies, and not to the world 
as a whole. If all of the world’s societies satisfy those norms, then 
we can say that the world as a whole is just, or that global justice 
has been achieved. On this conception, economic inequalities 
among societies are not an injustice; only unjustified inequalities 
within societies are.
On the unitary conception, there are norms of distributive 
justice that apply not to individual societies taken one-by-one, 
but rather to the world as a whole, considered as a single unit. 
If there are no unjustified inequalities among individuals in the 
world, the world will be just. So inequalities within states are not 
relevant; only inequalities among individuals across the globe are.
2  The disagreement between different views of global justice is also reflected in 
the ongoing discussion about different conceptions of human rights. In recent years, 
two different conceptions of human rights emerged: the political and the humanist 
conception. According to the former, human rights are claims that individuals have 
against states. According to the more traditional “humanist” conception, human 
rights are pre-institutional claims that individuals have against all other individuals 
in virtue of their common humanity. Clearly, the additive conception is at the ba-
sis of the political perspective, and the unitary conception is at the basis of the hu-
manist perspective. Since the practical conception implies that individuals will only 
have valid claims against their own states, and there are many different states in the 
world, it follows that there are many different standards of justice. On the contrary, 
on the humanist perspective, the same standards apply globally, and states are only 
an instrumental means to realize them. For a fairly sophisticated discussion of these 
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Who are the proponents of the additive conception, and what 
have they said, specifically? Clearly, Rawls is the most important 
scholar within this tradition. On his view, principles of justice, 
such as the difference principle, apply to the basic structure of 
domestic societies; but not to the world at large. As he stated in 
The Law of Peoples3, there are “duties of assistance” that wealthy 
states have to poor ones, and some minimal moral standards that 
ought to be respected (such as observing treaties and a duty of 
non-intervention). However, he energetically rejects the idea of 
applying a distributive principle such as the difference principle 
globally. For Rawls, a just world would be a world in which each 
state is internally just. This implies that if Norway is internally 
just and Nigeria is internally just, and there is a big economic 
difference between these two countries, the distribution of wealth 
will still be just. The fact that there are obvious economic inequa-
lities among states is not sufficient to trigger global distributive 
principles of justice. So for example if Norway is far better off than 
Nigeria, this does not mean that Norway will have the obligation 
to maximize the situation of Nigeria (or, more precisely, that the 
best—off across both countries will have to maximize the situa-
tion of the worse—off across both countries). This is because, for 
Rawls, the principles of justice apply solely to the basic structure 
of society. One might argue here that there is also a global basic 
structure, so principles of justice should also apply globally4; but 
Rawls thinks that there is no such global structure, or that, in any 
case, it is not the kind of structure that would trigger egalitarian 
duties of distributive justice, as central features of domestic basic 
structures are missing in it (e.g. absence of central world authority 
with coercive power, the fact that there are many incompatible 
3 Rawls, J. (2001). The law of peoples: with” The idea of public reason revisited”. Har-
vard University Press.
4 Beitz, C. R. (1999). Political theory and international relations. Princeton Univer-
sity Press.; and Pogge, T. W. M. (1989). Realizing Rawls. Cornell University Press.
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conceptions of the good, the empirical assumption that each so-
ciety is responsible for its own failure, and others).
Other writers who have defended the additive conception are 
Blake5, Nagel6 and Sangiovanni7.
Blake is concerned with what currently existing institutions 
ought to do to be justifiable to all. This approach distinguishes 
between duties that we have to strangers and duties that we have 
to our fellow citizens; not because we care more about fellow citi-
zens, but because there is an impartial principle that will give rise 
to distinct burdens of justification between individuals who share 
liability to the coercive power of a single state. State coercion is a 
fact, and we have to seek principles by which coercion could be 
justified. Only in the search for this justification, he argues, does 
egalitarian distributive justice becomes relevant. The connection 
between coercion and equality becomes clear through the notion 
of autonomy. Blake postulates that all individuals, regardless of 
institutional context, ought to have access to those goods and 
circumstances under which they are able to live as rational auto-
nomous agents, capable of selecting and pursuing plans of life in 
accordance with individual conceptions of the good. People can 
face a denial of autonomy for several reasons. Coercion is one of 
them. When somebody is being coerced, his or her will is being 
violated and replaced with the will of another person. Coercion, 
in other words, expresses a relation of domination in which our 
own agency is subdued by the agency of another. States act coerci-
vely with their own citizens on an ongoing basis; and this kind of 
coercion triggers duties of justice, as states have to justify to their 
citizens the policies that they coercively impose on them in order 
5 Blake, M. (2001). Distributive justice, state coercion, and autonomy. Philosophy 
& public affairs, 30(3), 257-296.
6 Nagel, T. (2005). The problem of global justice. Philosophy & public affairs, 33(2), 
113-147.
7 Sangiovanni, A. (2007). Global justice, reciprocity, and the state. Philosophy & 
public affairs, 35(1), 3-39.
53
Cristian Dimitriu
eidos nº 30 (2019) págs. 48-71
issn 2011-7477
to be legitimate. The reasonable way of doing this is by distributing 
burdens and benefits equally among the citizens. Now, this kind of 
ongoing coercion does not exist at the international level, he says. 
Therefore, international egalitarian duties of justice do not arise.
Regardless of the plausibility of Blake’s view, it is clear that 
we should classify it as an additive one. Standards of distributive 
justice apply only domestically, because what generates duties of 
distributive justice is state coercion, and state coercion only exists 
at the domestic level. Thus, standards of justice exist within states 
but not among individuals globally.
Nagel, as Blake, also emphasizes the importance of coercion, 
but adds to Blake’s conception an important dimension: citizens 
are not just subject to state coercion; they are also authors of the 
rules that the state ends up imposing on them. This dual rela-
tionship (both as subjects and authors of the system) is inexistent 
globally. Thus, duties of global distributive justice are also absent 
at the global level.
Finally, Sangiovanni justifies the existence of domestic stan-
dards of justice by appealing to the notion of ‘reciprocity’. As in 
Nagel, Sangiovanni states that there is a dual relationship between 
the state and citizens, which does not exist internationally: while 
the state delivers basic goods to its citizens, such as security or 
a stable system of property rights; citizens reciprocate by paying 
taxes, complying with laws, trusting and participating politically. 
Since all citizens participate in this scheme, they all owe each other 
a fair contribution to the goods on which everybody depends. We 
do not see a similar scheme at the international level.
As we can see, defenders of the additive conception disagree 
on how to defend the view that there are two different layers of 
justice. However, they all agree on a basic point: the necessary and 
sufficient conditions needed in order to trigger global standards of 
justice are not met. Either because the conditions that give rise to 
a domestic difference principle in Rawls are absent internationally; 
or because of lack of coercion, reciprocity or authorship at the 
global level; there simply is no justification for global standards 
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of justice. This, in practical terms, means that, for example, in-
equalities in salaries among teachers of public education within 
states might be unjustified (this would happen if teachers with the 
same seniority get different amounts at the end of the month); but 
inequalities of salaries among teachers of public education globally 
are not unjustified. It would be fine if teachers in Somalia make 
less than teachers in the US, as long as the internal standards of 
justice of both countries are satisfied.
Defenders of the unitary conception, on the other hand, have 
rejected the additive conception of global justice, and have ar-
gued that the standards of justice that apply internally within 
states should be extended globally. The main reason is that, in 
their view, there is not any relevant asymmetry between states 
and the world at large that justify different standards of justice 
for each of these domains. Philosophers who can be considered 
“unitarists” are Thomas Pogge8, Kok Chor Tan9, Simon Caney10 
and Moellendorf11.
Additivists have tried to show that such asymmetry does exist, 
but unitarists believe that they have not succeeded in doing so. This 
is either because the factors that supposedly trigger distributive 
principles of justice are not what actually triggers them (coercion, 
for example), or because those factors also exist globally. This, in 
practical terms, means that according to unitarists there cannot 
be justified reasons why the salaries of teachers of public schools 
make less in Somalia than in the US. If conditions are the same 
8 Pogge, T. W. (2008). World poverty and human rights. Polity, or Pogge, T. W. M. 
(1989). Realizing rawls. Cornell University Press.
9 Tan, K. C. (2004). Justice without borders: Cosmopolitanism, nationalism, and patrio-
tism. Cambridge University Press.
10‘Cosmopolitanism’ in Bell, D. (Ed.). (2010). Ethics and world politics. Oxford 
University Press. pp. 385-423;
 or ‘Cosmopolitanism and Justice’ in Christiano, T., & Christman, J. (Eds.). 
(2009). Contemporary debates in political philosophy (Vol. 17). John Wiley & Sons. 
pp.387-407.
11 Moellendorf, D. (2009). Global inequality matters. Springer.
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in both countries (same level of experience, responsibility, effort, 
etc.) the salary should be the same.
Two powerful intuitions lie at the center of the view that global 
standards of justice should be the same as domestic ones. We can 
call the first one the analogy intuition and the second one the luck 
egalitarian intuition. On the analogy intuition, there is a global 
basic structure which is not really different from the domestic 
basic structure; so, whatever is true of the domestic basic structu-
re should also be true of the global one. If egalitarian principles 
apply to the domestic basic structure, they should also apply to 
the global one. Additivists usually challenge this view by saying 
that there is a relevant difference between both structures, namely 
that the domestic basic structure is coercive, while the global 
basic structure is not. This is crucial, given that coercion is what 
triggers demands of justice in the first place, at least according to 
some versions of additivism. That the global basic structure is not 
coercive is usually shown by pointing at the fact that states are 
usually free to enter into agreements or to opt out of them. This 
kind of freedom does not exist domestically, where individuals 
have no choice but to comply with the state. The response that 
unitarists give to this objection is usually unanimous: opting out 
from international agreements is not really an option for develo-
ping countries who sign them, because the consequences of doing 
so would be too harsh on them12. Accepting a bad trade deal is 
better than no trade deal. So, the global basic structure should 
also be considered coercive.
The second intuition that lies at the center of the unitary view 
is the luck egalitarian one: since citizenship is a morally arbitrary 
factor, it should not determine life prospects. A person who is born 
in Switzerland should not have better chances at succeeding in 
life than a citizen who is born in Haiti, just because he was born 
12 For a discussion of this point see Cohen, J., & Sabel, C. (2006). Extra rempu-
blicam nulla justitia?. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 34(2), 147-175., fn. 24
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in that country. This in practical terms means that both deserve, 
for instance, the same health benefits. The additive view would 
then be mistaken, because it does not correct for these inequalities 
and opportunities.
outcome-view Premise. 
The two views described so far (i.e. the additive and the unitary) 
are, apparently, incompatible. However, they both rely on a basic 
premise. This premise is central in their account (although, of 
course, it is not the only premise that they hold). As I will argue 
later on, this basic premise is useless to identify some of the most 
pressing issues of injustice in real world. I will call this premise 
the “outcome-view”. If this premise is combined or supplemented 
with other (non-substantive) premises, then it might be possible 
to identify and assess these kinds of pressing issues of injustices. 
However, the outcome-view premise, independently, is insuffi-
cient for these purposes. Thus, the two views that I describe have 
the limitation that their core premise is not sufficient for the pur-
poses of locating these kinds of injustices. On the outcome-view 
premise, the standards we should use to assess the morality of a 
domestic or global arrangement are those that apply to outcomes. 
By “outcomes” I mean the opposite of “process”. A process is a 
history of exchanges between agents, which led to a certain state 
of affairs. An example of a process between individuals can be the 
history of trade transactions in a given society; and an example 
of a process between states can be the history of exploitation and 
colonialism that some nations have been the victims of. Both of 
these processes led to a certain state of affairs. The former pro-
bably led to some people being richer and others poorer; and the 
latter probably led to some countries being richer at the expense 
of others. An outcome, in contrast, is the result of a process, and it 
refers to a specific moment in time. The contrast between process 
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and outcome has been noticed by Robert Nozick13 and by Rainer 
Forst. Nozick actually defends a procedural account of justice, in 
the sense that he is more interested in how a pattern of distribution 
of goods came about, instead of the inherent justice/injustice of a 
given pattern. Forst14, on the other hand, criticizes the dominant 
and mainstream view of justice (which he calls recipient-oriented), 
which is concerned with the issue of what goods individuals justly 
receive or deserve, on the ground that it “obscures essential aspects 
of justice”.15 For example, he says, “the question of how the goods 
to be distributed come into existence is neglected in purely goods-
focused view”16. Forst proposes then to shift from a substantive 
based account to a more procedural one. On the outcome-view 
premise, in order to assess whether an outcome (e.g. a society in 
a given moment in time) is just or unjust, we should use moral 
concepts that apply to outcomes. Two such concepts are human 
rights and equality. Both the additivists and the unitarist defend 
these kinds of substantive concepts (although they disagree in the 
scope of their application). A possible way to apply these concepts 
is as follows. We look at society X in time Y. We see how wealth 
is distributed in society X. Suppose that in society X, a portion 
of the population lives below the poverty line, and a portion of 
it lives a very comfortable life. On the outcome-view premise, 
society X might be considered to be just/unjust on the grounds 
that it is unequal, or that it fails to respect the basic human rights 
of a portion of the population. The same kind of analysis can 
be extended to the world at large (that is, by considering all the 
individuals in the world, regardless of the state where they live). 
Defenders of the outcome-view premise might disagree on the scope 
of these standards—that is, on whether they apply within states 
13 Robert, N. (1974). Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York basic book.
14 Forst, R. (2014). Justification and critique: towards a critical theory of politics. Polity.
15  Ibid. Page 18
16  Ibid. Page 19
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only, or to the world at large. But they agree that they are valid 
standards to assess the global institutional domain. Human rights 
and equality enter into the picture in a very specific way: they refer 
to distributional outcome that should be achieved, irrespective of 
the process that led to such outcome. A country/world in which 
wealth is unequally distributed, or in which peoples’ rights to some 
minimal goods are not respected, would be unjust.
 However, there is a crucial problem with framing the debate 
around these substantive notions. The crucial problem is that 
massive global injustices are made invisible by this framework. To 
be clear, the problem is not simply that participants in the debate 
have forgotten to include these massive injustices in their accounts, 
or that they have neglected them. The deep problem, rather, is 
that by centering the debate on outcome-view premises (that is, 
by discussing global justice issues in under the umbrella of terms 
such as ‘human rights’, ‘equality’ or others), these massive kinds 
of injustice have gone unnoticed. To put it in different terms, the 
global justice debate has been framed in such a way that it becomes 
useless to assess why some critical processes are unjust. This does 
not mean that proponents of the additive or unitary conceptions 
only endorse outcome-based concepts. For example, cosmopoli-
tans such as Pogge, Tan, Moellendorf and others typically include 
procedural components in their theories, such as right to political 
participation. However, the debate has often been framed around 
substantive notions, and this suggests that a proper conception of 
justice should adopt a radically different approach.
What are the injustices that cannot be taken into account by the 
outcome-based view? Here I will mention just two. There might be 
others. The first one is what I will call the odious debts injustice (OD, 
from now on). This injustice lies in the fact that the international 
community is currently forcing (usually poor) states to pay off na-
tional debts that they do not have the moral obligation to pay off. 
This is a big financial burden for current and future generations, as 
these countries have to use a big portion of their national budgets 
to pay off these debts. The process by which the odious debts injus-
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tice takes place is the following. Often, corrupt governments (both 
autocratic and democratic ones) borrow money from international 
agencies (such as the IMF and the World Bank), governments or 
private investors in the name of the state they supposedly represent. 
Once they obtain the funds, they embezzle them, use them for pri-
vate purposes (i.e. their own personal non-authorized benefit), use 
them to oppress their own population, or to maintain themselves in 
power. Later on, lenders demand repayment of their loans. But this 
demand is made to the state in whose name the loan was incurred; 
not to the corrupt political leaders. Therefore, states end up bearing 
the burden of a debt that was fraudulently incurred in their name. 
Needless to say, corrupt leaders are almost never prosecuted. This 
is how international financial markets have been working. Since 
this happens on a massive scale, it involves billions of dollars. The 
fact that this injustice is massive becomes clear when we take into 
account these two important things: first, the nature of a government 
is irrelevant to establish the odiousness of a debt. Autocratic and 
democratic governments can both incur in odious debts, as public 
officials of those governments can borrow for odious purposes. 
Because of this, it is clear that the problem of odious debts has 
been affecting all kinds of countries, and not just autocratic ones, 
as some scholars have thought. Second: if a debt is odious, interest 
rates associated with those debts are also odious. Given that debtor 
countries, according to most empirical studies on debts, have been 
paying off more interests than capital, the problem of odious debts 
has multiplied. Most of the countries in Africa, for example, have 
paid off at least three times its debt, but the principal is still the same. 
This means that for debtor countries in that region, the injustice is 
not just that they are forced to repay the original loan, but that they 
have been forced to pay off the loan several times.
Since the injustice of odious debts is central in the current fi-
nancial system, and people can potentially dispute their scope, or 
even their existence, we can be more precise in defining the condi-
tions under which a sovereign debt is odious (or non-binding). By 
doing so, the reasons why the global justice debate have neglected 
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this kind of injustice will also become clear. A state can declare 
a debt non-binding when basically two conditions are satisfied. 
The first condition is that the public official of a state oversteps 
his authority as public official and uses borrowed funds for pur-
poses for which he is clearly and obviously not authorized. We 
can call this the authorization condition. If a public official satisfies 
the authorization condition, he can no longer be considered to 
be entitled to bind the state he represents, for he does not have 
authority to borrow for those purposes in the first place. Notice 
that the issue here is not whether the public official is authorized 
to rule (this seems to be irrelevant to determine the odiousness of 
a debt), but whether the public official is authorized to spend the 
money for those specific purposes. Now, one might argue here that 
the authorization condition is too vague, because there is always 
disagreement about what counts as spending borrowed funds 
in accordance with non-authorized funds. Some people believe 
that a public official is overstepping his authority if he bailouts 
private companies in times of crisis, and others believe that he 
is overstepping his authority if he uses public funds to provide 
healthcare to the poor (as some libertarians would think). In order 
to respond to this objection, we can be more specific in defining 
the authorization condition. The decision to spend the money by 
a public official in a certain way would count as non-authorized 
if there is no possible reasonable disagreement about the fact that 
it is non-authorized. People from all kinds of philosophical and 
political conceptions would agree that a public official cannot 
spend money to violate the basic human rights of the population 
of the state he represents, or that he cannot spend public funds 
for his own personal interest (such as buying himself expensive 
horses). The underlying reason why they would consider that 
the agent has authority to do certain things is precisely because 
people delegated him authority for those things; and it would 
be implausible to argue that they would delegate authority to 
someone, so that this person violate their basic human rights, or 
embezzles their entrusted funds. A second condition under which 
61
Cristian Dimitriu
eidos nº 30 (2019) págs. 48-71
issn 2011-7477
a sovereign loan is odious is that lenders are aware, or should 
have been aware, of the possible misuse of funds by the public 
officials. This condition would rule out potential arguments by 
the lenders that since they lent in good faith, and therefore did not 
know that the money was going to be misused, they are entitled 
to receiving back the full amount of the debt. We can call this 
the due diligence condition. This condition is satisfied when there 
are visible indications that a public official who borrows money 
will use it for non-authorized purposes. This happens when they 
have a clear record of corruption or oppression, or when there is 
something suspicious in the transaction itself. If the president of a 
state asks for money to build up an airport in his private residen-
ce, the chances that the transaction involves corruption are very 
high, even if this president has a clean record. The lender is on 
notice, and the good faith condition would be satisfied. When the 
authorization condition and the good faith condition are both simul-
taneously satisfied (i.e. when public officials use borrowed funds 
for non-authorized purposes, and the lenders knew or should have 
known about this), a debt is odious, and we should not consider 
it a state debt. If only the first condition is satisfied, the debt can 
also arguably be considered odious, but the case seems weaker. 
If only the second condition is satisfied, the debt will definitely 
not be odious, because even if there is something suspicious about 
the loan before it happens, the state will be bound if the money is 
spent in accordance with acceptable public purposes (such as for 
example building public roads or highways).
The second injustice that the outcome-view approach cannot 
capture is the resource curse (RC, from now on). The resource 
curse refers to the paradox that countries with an abundance of 
natural resources, like minerals and fuels; tend to have less eco-
nomic growth, less democracy, and worse development outcomes 
than countries with fewer natural resources. The resource curse 
is not just an economic process, which we can statistically verify. 
There are also clear injustices at its core. One of them is that what 
makes the resource curse possible is usually the fact that dictators 
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of countries affected by it seize the natural resources that belong 
to the state they represent (and therefore to the people). Another 
injustice is that the international community has been granting 
autocratic rulers legal title to natural resources that they do not 
really own. This is unjust, because these rulers do not even have 
authority to rule in the first place.
A dictator of an African nation who sells the oil of its state has 
the same kind of authority as a gang which occupies a warehouse 
by force and sells the things that are inside it. Despite this, the 
international community buys, from them on an ongoing basis, 
and do not oppose to them keeping the proceeds.
The idea that autocratic rulers have the right to sell the natural 
resources is expressed in what Leif Wenar has called the “might 
makes right” rule17, according to which de facto rulers are recog-
nized as being authorized to sell natural assets to the international 
community, simply in virtue of the fact that they are de facto rulers. 
As he says, “In this era, any ruler strong enough to stay in power 
also gained the internationally recognized legal right to abuse or 
neglect those he ruled, almost without limit. Which is to say that 
in this era, international law did not yet recognize what we now 
call human rights”18
As with OD, the injustice is massive. Exports of oil, diamonds, 
coffee, wheat and many other natural resources generate large 
amounts of money, and a big portion of it is generated under the 
rule of autocratic governments.
So why can’t the outcome-view premise assess the odious 
debts and the resource curse issues as an injustice? The reason, I 
believe, is that ODs and the RC are totally detached from this pre-
mise. By “detached” I mean that the reasons why OD and the RC 
17 Wenar, L. (2015). Blood oil: Tyrants, violence, and the rules that run the world. 
Oxford University Press.
Ch. 5
18  Wenar, Leif. Ibid. Page 74-75
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should be considered unjust are separate and independent from the 
outcome-view premise. In other words, OD and the RC are unjust, 
but not because of human rights deficits, or lack of equality, but 
for some other reasons. Pogge famously made an explicit connec-
tion between the notion of human rights and OD and the RC, by 
stating that “an economic order is unjust when it foreseeably and 
avoidably gives rise to massive and severe human rights deficits”19, 
and by mentioning OD and the RC as clear examples of policies 
that give rise to human rights deficits. In his own words,
These international resource, borrowing, treaty, and arms 
privileges we extend to such rulers are quite advantageous to 
them, providing them with the money and arms they need to 
stay in power—often with great brutality and negligible popular 
support. These privileges are also quite convenient to us, 
securing our resource imports from poor countries irrespective 
of  who may rule them and how badly. But these privileges have 
devastating effects on the global poor by enabling corrupt rulers 
to oppress them, to exclude them from the benefits of  their 
countries’ natural resources, and to saddle them with huge debts 
and onerous treaty obligations20.
As we can see, the kind of injustice that lies at the core of OD 
and RC for Pogge is mainly the fact that they contribute to human 
rights deficits. Let us see how the outcome-view premise is inade-
quate. Consider OD. It follows from applying the premise that we 
should consider them an injustice because of lack of equality or 
human rights deficits. However, none of these concepts are rele-
vant in the context of OD. Lack of equality between lenders and 
borrowers cannot be morally relevant to determine the odiousness 
19 Pogge, T. (2005). World poverty and human rights. Ethics & International 
Affairs, 19(1), 1-7.
The full text can be accessed here http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publica-
tions/journal/19_1/symposium/5109.html
20  Pogge, Thomas. Ibid.
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of a debt. Even in a background context of full equality, there 
could still be odious debts. In other words, inequality is neither 
a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the existence of odious 
debts. Consider the following hypothetical case. All the states 
in the world have roughly the same size and GDP. On the other 
hand, lenders are not substantially wealthier than states, and they 
do not take advantage in any way of the fact that they are in a 
position to lend. Could there still be odious debts in the world? 
The answer, clearly, is “yes”. This is because what makes a debt 
odious is the fact that a public official overstepped his authority; 
not that the transaction falls short of realizing some sort of dis-
tributional outcome. When I lend money to a customer, the fact 
that he is poor and I am rich (or, conversely, that he is rich and I 
am poor) does not render the debt non-binding. What renders the 
debt non-binding, as I said before, is that someone borrows in the 
name of a third party, without proper authorization.
Likewise, a world in which the basic rights of the population 
are satisfied is compatible with the existence of odious debts. 
The fact that the global order—as Pogge and others have called 
it—generates human rights deficits among the global south is 
irrelevant to determine whether a specific loan is odious. Even in 
a context where the basic human right to subsistence is massively 
unfulfilled, a debt can be binding (if for example the public official 
uses the funds for legitimate purposes); and in a context where the 
basic human right to subsistence is largely satisfied, a debt can be 
non-binding (if for example a public official embezzles a portion 
of the borrowed funds). Something similar can be said about the 
RC. Briefly, equality between trading partners, or human rights 
deficits, is not the central issue with the RC, as what makes the 
RC unjust is lack of authorization to rule in the name of the sta-
te, and not a certain distributional outcome. Pogge might have 
other conceptual resources to condemn ODs and the RC (such as 
procedural ones). But he does not use them in his argumentation. 
Again, since he is focused on the outcome-based paradigm, he 
relies on substantive notions only.
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To sum, the core notions of the additive and unitary concep-
tions of global justice—equality and human right—simply do 
not do any relevant work in assessing two of the most pressing 
issues in real world. The fact that these two conceptions have a 
disagreement regarding the scope of the application of equality 
and human rights does not really change things. Whether these 
notions have a domestic or a domestic or a global application, 
they are still useless to capture these injustices.
That ODs and the RC are detached from the outcome view also 
becomes clear when we see how the additive and unitary concep-
tions would treat ODs and the RC. Consider the additive conception 
would deal with these cases. As mentioned earlier, the additive 
conception defends domestic principles of distributive justice and, 
therefore, addresses domestic distributive inequalities. However, 
ODs and the RC are global issues that involve interactions between 
different kinds of agents, and they have global distributive conse-
quences. Therefore, ODs and the RC would fall outside the domain 
of issues that additivists address. Consider now how defenders 
of the unitary conception would deal with OD’s and the RC. The 
kind of interaction that citizens have with their own governments, 
and whether their governments are acting within their authority, 
is not a topic they deal with. In their view, there are pre-political 
global standards of distributive justice, and states have value only 
instrumentally: they are just as long as they implement these pre-
political global distributive standards within their borders effectively. 
Since OD’s and the RC are an injustice only in light of the fact that 
public officials have failed to properly represent their citizens (by 
overstepping the authority that their own citizens gave them), the 
unitary conception fails to take them into account. Unitarists can 
reply here that they do address these kinds of injustices, by taking 
into account their distributive results, globally. Since ODs and the RC 
generate poverty, or inequality, they would be unjust, they would 
say. However, the kind of injustice that ODs and the RC stand for 
is not a distributive one (that is, an injustice that results from failing 
to distribute goods in a certain way). In other words, what makes 
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a debt non-binding, or a sell of natural resources a theft, is not the 
fact that they generate poverty, or inequality, but rather an injustice 
that results from a specific kind of relationship between citizens 
and officials—namely, a relationship in which public officials fail 
to properly act as agents of the state. The upshot is that the set of 
debts and resource curses that the unitarists would consider mo-
rally problematic is different from the set that my account would 
generate. Moreover, the unitarists would not have enough argu-
ments to show where exactly the injustice lies, and why debts are 
non-binding, and resources stolen. Also, unitarists cannot plausibly 
consider this failed relationship between officials and the state an 
act of injustice, because abusing domestic public authority is in 
principle compatible with promoting distributive justice abroad, 
and a scenario in which public officials are corrupt domestically but 
benevolent globally would be welcome by them (as it is compatible 
with the outcome-view premise).
The conclusion that the outcome-based view is inadequate 
leads us to think that what makes the OD and the RC unjust is 
not that they fail to satisfy some kind of distributional outcome, 
such as human rights or equality. What lies at the heart of these 
two issues, rather, is what I call the “agent-principal” distinction, 
which is parallel to the agent-principal distinction in private law.
Public officials can be considered “agents”, in the sense that 
they are supposed to be authorized to make decisions in the name 
of the state they represent, and these decisions are binding for the 
state. The claim that public officials are agents is not new in politi-
cal philosophy; in fact, it has been at the core of the social contract 
tradition. Similarly, in private law, an agent is the person who is 
authorized to act in behalf of another. A CEO of a corporation is 
an agent, as he is entitled to act on behalf of the organization, and 
his decisions are binding upon the organization.
On the other hand, the population of a state can be conside-
red the “principal”. In private law, the principal is the person in 
whose name the agent is authorized to act. So, the population of 
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the state would be the person in whose name the public officials 
(i.e. the agents) are authorized to act.
In light of the agent-principal distinction, we can better unders-
tand what makes OD and the RC an injustice. In the case of OD, it 
is not lack of equality or human rights deficits what generated the 
injustice, but the fact that agents did not act properly in the name of 
the principal. Similarly, what makes the resource curse a problem 
of justice is not lack of equality among trading partners, or the 
effects that the resource curse has on countries in terms of poverty, 
but the fact that a public official is not the proper agent of the state 
or lacks authority to sell. As in the case of debts, to understand the 
injustice of the curse we need to analyze the relationship between 
citizens and their own states, and not whether there has been a 
human rights deficit or unequal bargaining positions.
The agent/principal distinction can be spelled out in more 
specific terms, and it can be used as an independent conception of 
global justice. This conception would fill the gap that I mentioned 
previously, as it would succeed at taking into account injustices 
such as OD and RC.
So, what would the agent/principal approach for global justice 
look like?
The approach would have three different dimensions. These 
three dimensions, simultaneously, would set procedural standards 
for global agreements and transactions. The standards I propose 
are (i) public officials’ authorization, (ii) international agents’ 
awareness, and (iii) ratification. 
(i) Public officials’ authorization. Standards views of the state, 
defended by contractualists and others, commonly believe that 
offices of public officials have certain duties and prerogatives 
attached to them. According to these views, citizens authorize 
public officials to act in accordance with these duties and pre-
rogatives, as it is the best way to uphold their rights. Although 
there is some disagreement about the exact content of the duties 
attached to public offices, we can confidently say that in general 
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there is some consensus that public officials can decide on public 
issues such as whether or not to go to war, whether or not to raise 
taxes (at least to certain point), decide on traffic laws and other 
things. It also follows from these views that public officials cannot 
do certain things, as they are totally incompatible with the duties 
attached to their offices. Whenever they do those things, they are 
no longer authorized by citizens to act or make decisions in their 
name. Thus, those actions or decisions are not binding for citizens. 
Take, for instance, the case of a public official who buys land from 
the state for 10% of its real value—with the complicity of friends 
who are public officials— and sells it a few years later for 100% 
of its value. Or consider the case of a public official who hires a 
private company to build a bridge, pays an unreasonably high 
price for the bridge, and later on keeps part of the proceeds of the 
company in his private bank account. Regardless of the view of 
state power that we endorse, I think it is clear that in these cases 
the public official clearly acted outside its competence and acted 
in ways that are incompatible with duties attached to his office.
(ii) Violation of international standards. Condition (i) refers 
to domestic injustices. But there are no global injustices by simply 
committing domestic injustices. However, if we combine condition 
(i) with condition (ii), we do obtain a global injustice. Condition 
(ii) is violated when an international agent (whether a bank, a 
state, a corporation or any other) is aware or should have been 
aware of the fact that it is contributing with unauthorized actions 
or decisions of public officials, by dealing with them in some way 
(e.g. trading, lending, signing agreements). By ‘contributing’ I 
simply mean that overstepping public authority would not have 
been possible without the intervention of the international agent 
that dealt with the public officials. Possible examples include 
ODs (as lenders are, or should have been aware, of the fact that 
public officials were going to use the funds for non-authorized 
purposes); and the RC, where buyers of goods are aware or should 
have been aware that the seller was not acting in accordance with 
public and legitimate public purposes. But other kinds of global 
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injustices become clearly visible if we combine conditions (i) and 
(ii). Consider for instance illicit financial flows. Illicit financial 
flows are illegal movements of money or capital from one cou-
ntry to another. A possible example is a public official who uses 
an anonymous shell company to transfer dirty money to a bank 
account in Switzerland. In cases like these ones, both conditions 
are also violated, as it is a case of a public official overstepping 
its authority and an agent being aware and contributing to this. 
The public official oversteps its authority by embezzling public 
funds, the recipient of the funds is aware or should be aware of 
this situation (a minimally standard of due care would reveal that 
funds were embezzled), and it contributes to the embezzling in 
the sense that without offering the possibility to keep the funds 
the illicit transaction would not be occur.
(iii) Ratification. Someone might argue that overstepping 
public authority is not a moral wrong, if people actually approve 
the actions of public officials. Thus, in order to make the first two 
conditions more compelling, a third condition should be introdu-
ced: ratification. By “ratification” I mean the approval, by people 
of a state, of an act of public officials, where public officials lacked 
authority to legally bind the people of that state. The approval can 
have many forms, including express consent through referenda, 
or simply failing to oppose a decision of a public official when it 
is possible to do so (take, for instance, the case of a democratic 
government that borrows excessively from international agencies 
and, despite the possibility that people are aware of this and can 
do something to stop it, simply go on with their lives as if nothing 
had happened—silence, in this case, should be interpreted as 
ratification). The “ratification” condition is not satisfied when it 
is neither possible nor feasible for people to actually make their 
opposition to actions of public officials explicit. This typically 
happens in a society in which there are no basic liberties, such as 
autocratic governments. It also happens within democratic gover-
nments, when officials make secret decisions (typically bribing), 
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act by surprise or use public force to intimidate the opposition. In 
this context, silence cannot be interpreted as ratification.
In a nutshell, when conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) are jointly vio-
lated, international transactions and agreements will be unjust.
The new direction of the research in global justice that I suggest 
is to discuss global transactions in light of the agent/principal, 
awareness and ratification conditions. If we do this, we will be 
able to classify massive distributive processes as unjust. Adopting 
my approach would yield the result that not only national debts, 
the resource curse and illicit financial flows are a moral problem. 
Other processes, such as illicit environmental degradation caused 
for example by mining companies and other corporations, global 
corruption and others will become noticeable. This is so because 
they all have in common the fact that public officials, in their role 
as agents of the state, exceeded their authority—(for example by 
corruptly lowering environmental standards, or by accepting bri-
bes), there was an international agent involved who was or should 
have been aware of the public officials’ unauthorized actions, and 
people were unable to ratify the decision of public officials. On my 
account, the world is unjust, but not because we have not achie-
ved equality, or because powerful nations have failed to fulfill the 
human rights of vulnerable people in weaker nations, but because 
minimal moral standards of interactions have not been satisfied.
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